Socrates’ claim that nobody does wrong knowingly – Essay

According to Socrates (Plato, 1961) it is not in human nature to choose to act in a way what one believes to be harmful, instead of a way that is good.  He claimed that all wrong, or evil, is only done out of ignorance and not from the intention to do evil. This view appears controversial because people are known to occasionally commit deeds that are apparently evil either out of self-interest or acting on impulse, against their best. However, when we look at the logics behind human behaviours and motivation, the concept begins to make more sense. Socrates asserted that all human actions were driven by self-interest. He also argued that this instinct prevents people from intentionally harming themselves and that when people do harmful things, it is only out of ignorance; either not knowing what will benefit them the most, not knowing the correct method of attaining that benefit, or not knowing how not to do something which is harmful to them. Socrates saw no conflict between self-interest and morality. On the contrary, he saw virtue as the greatest benefit and maintained that immoral actions actually harmed the agent and could therefore only be committed out of ignorance and misunderstanding of what the greatest benefit is.  The aim of this essay is to demonstrate how it is possible that nobody does wrong knowingly.

Right and wrong, good and bad are typically associated with human actions, and Socrates has successfully demonstrated that the motivation for every action is self-interest. According to him, an individual will always choose the course of action that, at the time of decision, is perceived to bring them the greatest benefit (or the least harm) out of all available options. This is true even for actions that appear altruistic. For example, someone who gives money to charity does so because it makes them feel good and they perceive the pleasure derived from helping people as a greater benefit than spending the money on themselves. What an individual perceives as the best course of action may not necessarily align with what they want. As Socrates tells Polus (Plato, 2013) that one chooses to drink medicine for the sake of health, a longer-term benefit, even though it is unpleasant and is not what one ones to do. Therefore, a person may choose an unpleasant means or sacrifice some short-term gain, if they believe the end result will benefit them. Socrates (Plato, 2013) also suggests that “tyrants” do not simply kill or exile people because they want to, but because they think it “conduces to their own good”. This demonstrates that all actions, whether they appear selfish or altruistic, good or evil, pleasant or not, are driven by the instinct to benefit oneself.

Socrates further argued that it is against human nature to harm oneself knowingly, or go against one’s own self interest. In Protagoras (Plato, 1961) he claims that: “No one who either knows or believes that there is another course of action better than the one he is following will ever continue on his present course when he might choose the better”. In other words, Socrates attributed any actions that harm the actor to ignorance or lack of knowledge. This position was challenged by Plato (in his later works) and, even more so, by Aristotle (Lemke, 1999). They recognised the existence of “moral weakness”. This is when people act against their best judgement, knowing that something is bad or harmful (possibly even being ashamed of it), but still doing it due to lack of self-control or out of passion. For example, an alcoholic knows the negative consequences of drinking wine, but does it anyway, unable to resist. This proposition seems to contradict the idea that nobody does wrong knowingly, but the two are not mutually exclusive. Moral weakness can be viewed as a form of ignorance, like not knowing how to overcome one’s intemperance.  Or being blinded by pain or passion, perceivable only to the individual, doing the “wrong” thing may seem like the only option, and not a choice at all. So, if a person is aware that they are acting wrongly, but unaware of how to overcome internal or external factors forcing them to take this course of action, they are doing it out of ignorance and not because they choose to harm themselves.

Beliefs about what is right behaviour and what is wrong behaviour are known as morality (Merriam-Webster, 2013) and have occupied the minds of philosophers for centuries. When self-interest (the greatest motivator) is concerned, people have been known to act immorally, which appears to contradict the idea that nobody does wrong knowingly. For example, if someone was erroneously given more money than they were due, it seems that it would in their interest to keep it; but that would be immoral. Nevertheless, it is important to understand that Socrates saw no conflict between acting out of self-interest and being moral (Nil, 1985). He believed that the greatest benefit lay not in material riches, but in the “improvement of the soul” (Plato, 1993) and that living a life of virtue resulted in greater pleasure and inner-peace than being unjust or immoral. He saw that those who strive for other pleasures, such as wealth and power, do not know where their true interest lies. Therefore, by acting immorally or harming others, they are actually harming themselves even more by detracting from their own virtue and therefore from their own happiness. Keeping in mind that nobody willingly harms him or herself, acting immorally is a result of ignorance and not knowing where one’s true interests lie.

From this we can explain Socrates’ viewnobody does wrong knowingly in the following way: The motivation for any actions is self-interest and nobody will willingly harm themselves if they know a way not to. Everybody chooses that action which seems best at the time of decision. The best kind of self-interest, in Socrates’ view, is living a virtuous life, which is the ultimate source of happiness. Therefore, evil actions are a result of misguided motivation and lack of understanding of what is the greatest good. Following this logic, those who do not think virtue is the ultimate self-benefit are either misguided or will not necessarily perceive traditionally immoral actions as wrong, as long as they’re in line with that which they do perceive as the greater interest. It is this chain of thought that explains why “There is only one good, knowledge, and one evil, ignorance” (Diogenes Laertius, 1925) and how it is possible that all wrongdoing is the result of ignorance and lack of understanding rather than the intention to do wrong.

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References

Diogenes Laertius (1925). Lives of eminent philosophers. London: W. Heinemann

Merriam-Webster (2013). Merriam-Webster Dictionary. Morality. Retrieved December 12, 2013 from http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/morality

Lemke S. W (1999). Moral Weakness and Moral Virtue. New Orleans Baptist Theological Seminary Retrieved December 7, 2013 from http://www.nobts.edu/faculty/itor/lemkesw/personal/aarethics.html .

Nill, M. (1989) Morality and Self Interest in Protagoras Antiphon and Democritus. Leiden, The Netherlands: E. J. Brill.

Plato (January 15, 2013). Gorgias. The Project Gutenberg EBook of Gorgias. Retrieved Novmber 30, 2013 from http://www.gutenberg.org/files/1672/1672-h/1672-h.htm

Plato (1993) The Apology. The Last Days of Socrates. London: Penguin Books Ltd. pp. 37-67.

Plato (1961). The Collected Dialogues of Plato. Edited by Cairns H. and  Hamilton E. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Black Moon, 1975, dir. Louis Malle

Dubbed as an “apocalyptic fantasy” with references to the feminist movement of the 70s and “Alice in Wonderland,” the film is like a recording of dream of a highly imaginative mind…

One of the weirdest movies I’ve seen, although the weirdness is completely justified. It’s great, really.

 

 

“Imitation and Gender Insubordination” by Judith Butler – A summary

The aim of Butler’s essay (2009), according to her, is to resist homophobic regulatory oppression through rethinking gender and sexuality. She points out that identity categories are tools of oppressive regulatory systems. Butler opposes an essentialist approach of fitting sexuality into a clear-cut definition, as this does not account for all the complexities and the pluralities within a particular group. She questions whether there is a right way to be gay and maintains that asserting this would be discriminating against homosexuals that do not fit into that framework. Instead, she suggests that sexuality is fluid and unclear and even implies that that is what makes it sexy.

A key idea for Butler is that all gender and sexuality is performative. An example of homophobic oppression that Butler is trying to resist is the claim that homosexuality is a “bad copy” of heterosexuality. Rather than arguing this is not so, Butler proposes this can be said about all sexuality and gender. By using the example of “drag,” she demonstrates that gender can be acted out and “worn”, concluding that physical sex and gender are separate entities. Also testifying to her argument are expressions that claim someone can feel more or less “like a woman” or “like a man”, which suggest these categories are not natural but assumed identities. Butler argues not only that gender and sexuality can both be performed, but that they are always performative. In other words, it’s not being a heterosexual that causes one to act as a heterosexual. Rather, repeatedly acting in a way that is associated with being heterosexual is what defines one as such. Butler insists that heterosexuality is an imitation of an idealised concept of what heterosexuality is – an imitation of itself. Therefore, even if homosexuality is a copy, it’s only a copy of a copy as there is no original, similar to Baudrillard’s theory of “simulacra” (2009).

Butler also argues that similarly to how gender is not physiologically natural, it’s also not natural to the psyche. She maintains that it’s an effect of the complexities that occur with the formation of an identity, rather than its cause. Therefore the notion of an “inner sex” is just an illusion. Butler believes that for this reason, any given performance can never fully express sexuality, similarly to how a “self” in the mirror, is not a complete expression of the agent in Lacan’s “Mirror Stage” theory (2009). She says that if identity is constituted by performance, breaks in that performance can cause a disruption of an identity. She concludes that people are subconsciously aware of this and compulsively repeat acts to confirm their heterosexuality. Butler suggests to position sexuality against identity and gender and to embrace the disruption caused by the psychic access that cannot be expressed by performance.

There are parts of Butler’s complex essay that I agree with, and others that I find questionable. The idea that gender and sexuality can only be expressed through performance makes sense. Similarly, fitting identities into rigid boundaries can be limiting, not only in terms of sexuality, but also in other spheres of life. The term “gender benders” in popular culture was coined to describe people who push these boundaries and cause “gender trouble”. Performers like Madonna and Prince were noted for this. The Austrian singer Conchita Wurst is a more recent example. Having the appearance of a woman but also a beard, she simultaneously rejects and embraces both genders. However, Foucault would argue that identity groups could also serve for the purpose of resistance by those against whom this type of discourse is positioned. Also, Butler diagnosing people who are consistent in their practices (be those “straight” or “gay”) as “compulsive” seems to reinforce the very oppression Butler is trying to resist. After all, she bases the idea that instability is sexy mostly on personal experience, while others may prefer consistency, even if it is performative.

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References

Baudrillard J. (2009).  The Precession of Simulacra. In J. Storey (Ed.), Cultural Theory and Popular Culture: A Reader (4th ed.) (pp. 409-415). Harlow:  Pearson.

Butler, J. (2009). Imitation and Gender Insubordination. Cultural Theory and Popular Culture: An Anthology. Ed. J. Storey. (pp. 224 – 238) Harlow: Pearson.

Foucault, M. (2009). “Method.” Cultural Theory and Popular Culture: An Anthology. Ed. J. Storey. (pp. 313 – 319) Harlow: Pearson.

Lacan J. (2009). The Mirror Stage as Formative of the Function of the I as Revealed in Psychoanalytic Experience. Cultural Theory and Popular Culture: An Anthology. Ed. J. Storey. (pp. 255 – 260) Harlow: Pearson.

“What is this ‘black’ in black popular culture?” by Stuart Hall – A summary

Hall’s main idea in this essay (2009) is that a dialogic approach is a better strategy than an essentialist one in relation to black popular culture. According to Storey (2009) one of the roles of cultural studies is to “help to defeat racism” through developing an understanding that race is merely a historical category, rather than a biological or epistemological absolute. Hall argued that although achievements of cultural struggles may be limited, they are real. He pointed out that in a cultural hegemony there is never a pure win or loss, but some positions have been won to achieve better outcomes for marginal groups. Hall’s interest, therefore, was in cultural strategies that can make a difference and “shift the dispositions of power”.

Hall opposed the reliance on essentialism in discussions of black popular culture as it takes racial difference out of its historical, cultural and political context and presents it as something biological and universal. Although Hall mentioned that at one point in history essentialism was inevitable and perhaps played an important part in winning black cultural expression a space within the framework of popular culture, it is no longer the best strategy. Hall therefore saw that essentialism only reinforces the racist strategies it is trying to break down by conceding that racial differences are natural. He was concerned that this approach would police people to stay within the mythical boundaries of what is appropriate for their race, as is evident in popular culture today and individuals who fail to comply with these racial expectations can be ridiculed and disapproved of (think of “wiggers”). Hall also saw that focusing on “black” as the signifier of identity could lead to other forms of cultural oppression. For example, expression of black masculinity could still be oppressive to black women or gay black men.

Hall called for a dialogic approach to black popular culture, to acknowledge that its discourse is defined by its relationship and response to other discourses: e.g. the mutual influences of black and white cultures on each other and the negotiation of black expression that allowed it to become “popular” within the white hegemony. Hall saw black popular culture as contradictory and diverse and not to be simplified to binary oppositions such as “black versus white.” Instead, he suggested focusing on incorporation, for example the possibility of being both black and British. This also allows to acknowledge the differences within black expression, for example to determine which representations are accurate in reflecting black experiences and which are not.

Hall wrote this paper over 20 years ago, but it seems that the persistence of essentialism in relation to popular culture and race still prevails. Certain forms of expression are seen as predominantly white or black and society is still not entirely comfortable with those who are seen as crossing these boundaries. Even the persistence of discourse that someone is acting like “a black/white/Asian person” is essentialist. However, despite these stereotypes we see more collaborative projects between black and white artists in the music industry. There is also greater blending and incorporation of genres and bands like Linkin Park that mash rock and rap together. Although this does not show a full turn to dialogism, perhaps these are the steps that will lead to the adoption of this approach some decades later.

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References:

Hall S. (2009). What is this “black” in black popular culture? in Popular culture and cultural theory: A reader. 4th ed. by Storey, J. Essex: Pearson.

Storey, J. (2009). Popular culture and cultural theory: An introduction. 6th ed. Essex: Pearson.

“Ruling class and ruling ideas” by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels – A summary

In “The Ruling Class and the Ruling Ideas “(1970), Marx and Engels argue that the prevailing ideas of a particular society are formed by the ruling class to express and justify their position. This contrasts the view that ideas and values within a society exist separately from political or economical leadership. Marx and Engels propose that the class in control of the material production also controls the “mental production”. While regular citizens are busy with their day-to-day tasks, part of the ruling class take on the function of the “thinkers”, those whom we see as subject matter experts, and actively develop and promote those values and messages. The ruling class also has some control over the dissemination of these ideas. In modern times for example, by financing blockbuster films that to a larger or lesser extent reinforce the ruling ideas. Marx and Engels also argue that these “illusions” about society are upheld by detaching them from the ruling class, as if they exist independently in a particular time (mainly because the ruling class itself believes these ideas are relevant to all their contemporaries). The ideas are then presented as universal truths and as serving the general public interest. As a result, ideas that reinforce and justify the ruling class’s positions appear as though they have naturally developed within the society.

Marx (1976) stresses that it is not the dominant ideas of a particular time that determine its social system, but the economic production (or the “base”) that shapes the prevailing ideas (or the “superstructure”) which in turn reinforce this system and give it meaning. For example, in the feudal medieval society in Europe a theological worldview asserted by aristocracy and disseminated by the church gave meaning to feudalism. The peasants came to believe one’s place in the class system was God’s will and obeying authority would be rewarded after death. According to Marx, as economy develops, the superstructure needs to be adjusted and as the economic base changes, social revolution occurs (either gradually through reform or quickly as an uprising). For example, the growing industrialisation and international trade in England resulted in the middle-class playing a more important part in the economy and thus becoming more powerful. With that a new ideology of liberty and self-profit started to develop, eventually leading to a revolution and propagation of new ruling ideas by a new ruling class.

Marxist theory about the economic base as the key driving force of society is particularly fascinating in explaining how the ruling class ideas work. It also emphasises the importance of considering popular culture in relation to its context. However, Marx’s writing has several key limitations. Firstly, it presents the public as passively accepting the ruling ideas.  In reality people are active participants in popular culture, and individuals may choose to accept or reject these ideas and some may also promote or contest them. Secondly, Marx’s writing does not acknowledge the existence of alternative ideas, which may not dominate, but are still present in most societies. Gramsci’s reflections on hegemony (1971) and its dependence on consent help to fill these gaps in the study of popular culture – a contested area shaped by “contradictory pressures and tendencies” (Bennett, 1986) arising from competing interests of different groups within society.

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References:

Bennett, T. (1986). Hegemony, intellectuals and the state, in Storey J (ed.) Cultural theory and popular culture: A Reader. 4th ed. Essex: Pearson, 2009

Gramsci A. (1971). Popular culture and the ‘Turn to Gramsci’, in Storey J (ed.) Cultural theory and popular culture: A Reader. 4th ed. Essex: Pearson, 2009

Marx K. (1976). Base and Superstructure Ruling class and ruling ideas, in Storey J (ed.) Cultural theory and popular culture: A Reader. 4th ed. Essex: Pearson, 2009

Marx K. and Engels F. (1970). Ruling class and ruling ideas, in Storey J (ed.) Cultural theory and popular culture: A Reader. 4th ed. Essex: Pearson, 2009.

“The Precession of Simulacra” by Jean Baudrillard – a summary

In his essay (2009), Baudrillard argues for the idea that people no longer distinguish between reality and a constructed representation of reality or a simulacrum. He initially draws an analogy with , where a map is created, so precise in scale and detail that it is impossible to tell it apart from the empire it maps.  So the map, a simulation, becomes confused for the real terrain until it rots away. However, Baudrillard goes on to say that this allegory is no longer relevant for us, because in today’s world the simulation is no longer a reflection of reality, nor a reference to it, but a creation of a new real by models that are not based on reality. He calls this the “hyperreal”, saying the difference between the map and the territory disappears completely.

Baudrillard then talks about the power of images and symbols to subvert reality. He draws the distinction between pretence and simulation via the example of illness. If a man pretends to be ill, he may sit in bed, but does not possess any symptoms of illness. A simulator, however, will posses some of these symptoms, making it impossible to tell whether he is sick or not, provided he produces true symptoms. Baudrillard argues the impossibility of making a distinction between reality and simulation undermines the real itself. This is in line with Lyotard’s concept of “incredulity towards metanarratives” (1984), which he ascribes to postmodernism: a skepticism towards traditional frameworks of what is true or right or wrong and how to establish it. The idea that anything can be simulated, from God’s divinity in icons to symptoms of insanity, not only questions the systems that traditionally determine what is real, like religion and science, but the relevance of reality altogether.

Baudrillard suggests that we are being coerced into believing the simulacra around us are real (presumably by the ruling class together with our desire to believe). He uses Disneyland as an example, saying that it is “presented as imaginary in order to make us believe that the rest is real”. He points out that the obvious childishness and fictitiousness of this world is contrasted to the rest of America so we believe that outside of Disneyland we’re living in the real world, but in truth, the outside world is just as childish and based on fictitious ideologies. Baudrillard furthers his argument by suggesting that the Watergate scandal was only portrayed as a scandal to make us believe that such corruption and immorality was a one-off instance, rather than the daily occurrence in the politics (which is also a simulacra), and to restore faith in the system of justice. This asserts the need for a critical approach to information and questioning whom it benefits.

I am convinced by Baudrillard’s analyses of how simulation displaces the real, but feel that precession of simulacra is not unique to this era. Simulation was probably born when humanity first started to search for meaning instead of accepting reality as it is. It is not by chance that Baudrillard mentions religion (perhaps the oldest simulacrum) and the fears of Iconoclasts that icons would replace the idea of God and his very existence.  What is unique to postmodernism is our uncapped ability to produce and disseminate information, which leads to greater volumes and heterogeneity of the hyperreal, ranging from world politics to fan-fiction. On the other hand, who is to say that objects and actions are more real than the products of our minds, considering that our only access to reality is through the prism of our own perception?

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References:

Baudrallard J. (2009) The Precession of Simulacra. In J. Storey (Ed.), Cultural Theory and Popular Culture: A Reader (4th ed.) (pp. 409-415). Harlow: Pearson

Lyotard J. (1984). The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge. (B. Massumi & G. Bennington, Trans.). MN: University of Minnesota Press